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RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge: 
 
 
 Capitol Records, LLC (“Capitol”), the 
recording label for such classic vinyls as 
Frank Sinatra’s “Come Fly With Me” and 
The Beatles’ “Yellow Submarine,” brings 
this action against ReDigi Inc. (“ReDigi”), a 
twenty-first century technology company 
that touts itself as a “virtual” marketplace 
for “pre-owned” digital music.  What has 
ensued in a fundamental clash over culture, 
policy, and copyright law, with Capitol 
alleging that ReDigi’s web-based service 
amounts to copyright infringement in 
violation of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 
“Copyright Act”), 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.  
Now before the Court are Capitol’s motion 
for partial summary judgment and ReDigi’s 
motion for summary judgment, both filed 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56.  Because this is a court of law and not a 
congressional subcommittee or technology 
blog, the issues are narrow, technical, and 
purely legal.  Thus, for the reasons that 
follow, Capitol’s motion is granted and 
ReDigi’s motion is denied. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Facts 
 
 ReDigi markets itself as “the world’s first 
and only online marketplace for digital used 
music.”1                                                        
1 The facts are taken from the pleadings, the parties’ 
Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements, the affidavits 
submitted in connection with the instant motions, and 
the exhibits attached thereto.  The facts are 
undisputed unless otherwise noted.  Where one 
party’s 56.1 Statement is cited, the other party does 
not dispute the fact asserted, has offered no 
  (Capitol 56.1 Stmt., Doc. No. 50 
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(“Cap. 56.1”), ¶ 6.)  Launched on October 
13, 2011, ReDigi’s website invites users to 
“sell their legally acquired digital music 
files, and buy used digital music from others 
at a fraction of the price currently available 
on iTunes.”  (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.)  Thus, much like 
used record stores, ReDigi permits its users 
to recoup value on their unwanted music.  
Unlike used record stores, however, ReDigi’s 
sales take place entirely in the digital domain.  
(See ReDigi Reply 56.1 Stmt., Doc. No. 83 
(“RD Rep. 56.1”), 4 ¶ 16.) 
 
 To sell music on ReDigi’s website, a user 
must first download ReDigi’s “Media 
Manager” to his computer.  (ReDigi 56.1 
Stmt., Doc. No. 56 (“RD 56.1”), ¶ 8.)  Once 
installed, Media Manager analyzes the 
user’s computer to build a list of digital 
music files eligible for sale.  (Id.)  A file is 
eligible only if it was purchased on iTunes 
or from another ReDigi user; music 
downloaded from a CD or other file-sharing 
website is ineligible for sale.  (Id.)  After 
this validation process, Media Manager 
continually runs on the user’s computer and 
attached devices to ensure that the user has 
not retained music that has been sold or 
uploaded for sale.  (Id. ¶ 10.)  However, 
Media Manager cannot detect copies stored 
in other locations.  (Cap. 56.1 ¶¶ 59-61, 63; 
see Capitol Reply 56.1 Stmt., Doc. No. 78 
(“Cap. Rep. 56.1”), ¶ 10.)  If a copy is 
detected, Media Manager prompts the user 
to delete the file.  (Cap. 56.1 ¶ 64.)  The file 
is not deleted automatically or involuntarily, 
though ReDigi’s policy is to suspend the 
accounts of users who refuse to comply.  (Id.)          
 
 After the list is built, a user may upload 
any of his eligible files to ReDigi’s “Cloud 
Locker,” an ethereal moniker for what is, in 
fact, merely a remote server in Arizona.  
(RD 56.1 ¶¶ 9, 11; Cap. 56.1 ¶ 22.)                                                                                     
admissible evidence to refute that fact, or merely 
objects to inferences drawn from that fact. 
ReDigi’s upload process is a source of 
contention between the parties.  (See RD 
56.1 ¶¶ 14-23; Cap. Rep. 56.1 ¶¶ 14-23.)  
ReDigi asserts that the process involves 
“migrating” a user’s file, packet by packet – 
“analogous to a train” – from the user’s 
computer to the Cloud Locker so that data 
does not exist in two places at any one 
time.2
 
  (RD 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 36.)  Capitol asserts 
that, semantics aside, ReDigi’s upload 
process “necessarily involves copying” a file 
from the user’s computer to the Cloud 
Locker.  (Cap. Rep. 56.1 ¶ 14.)  Regardless, 
at the end of the process, the digital music 
file is located in the Cloud Locker and not 
on the user’s computer.  (RD 56.1 ¶ 21.)  
Moreover, Media Manager deletes any 
additional copies of the file on the user’s 
computer and connected devices.  (Id. ¶ 38.)   
 Once uploaded, a digital music file 
undergoes a second analysis to verify 
eligibility.  (Cap. 56.1  ¶¶ 31-32.)  If ReDigi 
determines that the file has not been 
tampered with or offered for sale by another 
user, the file is stored in the Cloud Locker, 
and the user is given the option of simply 
storing and streaming the file for personal 
use or offering it for sale in ReDigi’s 
marketplace.  (Id. ¶¶ 33-37.)  If a user 
chooses to sell his digital music file, his 
access to the file is terminated and 
transferred to the new owner at the time of 
purchase.  (Id. ¶ 49.)  Thereafter, the new 
owner can store the file in the Cloud Locker, 
stream it, sell it, or download it to her 
computer and other devices.  (Id. ¶ 50.)  No 
money changes hands in these transactions.  
(RD Rep. 56.1 5 ¶ 18.)  Instead, users buy 
music with credits they either purchased                                                         
2 A train was only one of many analogies used to 
describe ReDigi’s service.  At oral argument, the 
device was likened to the Star Trek transporter – 
“Beam me up, Scotty” – and Willy Wonka’s 
teleportation device, Wonkavision. (Tr., dated Oct. 5, 
2012 (“Tr.”), 10:2-12; 28:15-20.)  
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from ReDigi or acquired from other sales.  
(Id.)  ReDigi credits, once acquired, cannot 
be exchanged for money.  (Id.)  Instead, they 
can only be used to purchase additional 
music.  (Id.)     
 
 To encourage activity in its marketplace, 
ReDigi initially permitted users to preview 
thirty-second clips and view album cover art 
of songs posted for sale pursuant to a 
licensing agreement with a third party.  (See 
RD 56.1 ¶¶ 73-78.)  However, shortly after 
its launch, ReDigi lost the licenses.  (Id.)  
Accordingly, ReDigi now sends users to 
either YouTube or iTunes to listen to and 
view this promotional material.  (Id. ¶¶ 77, 
79.)  ReDigi also offers its users a number of 
incentives.  (Cap. 56.1 ¶ 39.)  For instance, 
ReDigi gives twenty-cent credits to users 
who post files for sale and enters active 
sellers into contests for prizes.  (Id. ¶¶ 39, 
42.)  ReDigi also encourages sales by 
advising new users via email that they can 
“[c]ash in” their music on the website, 
tracking and posting the titles of sought after 
songs on its website and in its newsletter, 
notifying users when they are low on credits 
and advising them to either purchase more 
credits or sell songs, and connecting users 
who are seeking unavailable songs with 
potential sellers.  (Id. ¶¶ 39-48.)   
 
 Finally, ReDigi earns a fee for every 
transaction.  (Id. ¶ 54.)  ReDigi’s website 
prices digital music files at fifty-nine to 
seventy-nine cents each.  (Id. ¶ 55.)  When 
users purchase a file, with credits, 20% of 
the sale price is allocated to the seller, 20% 
goes to an “escrow” fund for the artist, and 
60% is retained by ReDigi.3                                                        
3 On June 11, 2012, ReDigi launched ReDigi 2.0, 
new software that, when installed on a user’s 
computer, purportedly directs the user’s new iTunes 
purchases to upload from iTunes directly to the 
Cloud Locker.  (RD 56.1 ¶¶ 40-41.)  Accordingly, 
while access may transfer from user to user upon 
resale, the file is never moved from its initial location 
  (Id.)                                   
B.  Procedural History 
 
 Capitol, which owns a number of the 
recordings sold on ReDigi’s website, 
commenced this action by filing the 
Complaint on January 6, 2012.  (See 
Complaint, dated Jan. 5, 2012, Doc. No. 1 
(“Compl.”); Cap.  56.1 ¶¶ 68-73.)  In its 
Complaint, Capitol alleges multiple 
violations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101, et seq., including direct copyright 
infringement, inducement of copyright 
infringement, contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement, and common law 
copyright infringement.  (Compl. ¶¶ 44-88.)  
Capitol seeks preliminary and permanent 
injunctions of ReDigi’s services, as well as 
damages, attorney’s fees and costs, interest, 
and any other appropriate relief.  (Id. at 17-
18.)  On February 6, 2012, the Court denied 
Capitol’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
finding that Capitol had failed to establish 
irreparable harm.  (Doc. No. 26.)   
 
 On July 20, 2012, Capitol filed its motion 
for partial summary judgment on the claims 
that ReDigi directly and secondarily 
infringed Capitol’s reproduction and 
distribution rights.  (Doc. No. 48.)  ReDigi 
filed its cross-motion the same day, seeking 
summary judgment on all grounds of 
liability, including ReDigi’s alleged 
infringement of Capitol’s performance and 
display rights.4                                                                                   
in the Cloud Locker.  (Id. ¶¶ 44-52.)  However, 
because ReDigi 2.0 launched after Capitol filed the 
Complaint and mere days before the close of 
discovery, the Court will not consider it in this action.  
(See Tr. 19:2-20:3.)   
  (Doc. No. 54.)  Both parties 
 
4 ReDigi’s arguments in this round of briefing differ 
markedly from those it asserted in opposition to 
Capitol’s motion for a preliminary injunction.  (See 
ReDigi Opp’n to Prelim. Inj., dated Jan. 27, 2012, 
Doc. No. 14 (“ReDigi Opp’n to PI”).)  For instance, 
ReDigi no longer asserts an “essential step defense,” 
nor does it argue that “copying” to the Cloud Locker 
for storage is protected by the fair use defense.  (Id. at 
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responded on August 14, 2012 and replied on 
August 24, 2012.  (Doc. Nos. 76, 79, 87, 90.)  
The Court heard oral argument on October 
5, 2012. 
 
II.  LEGAL STANDARD 
 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a), a court may not grant a 
motion for summary judgment unless “the 
movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 
(1986).  The moving party bears the burden 
of showing that it is entitled to summary 
judgment.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).  The court 
“is not to weigh evidence but is instead 
required to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment, to draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of that party, and to 
eschew credibility assessments.”  Amnesty 
Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 
122 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.  
As such, “if there is any evidence in the 
record from any source from which a 
reasonable inference in the [nonmoving 
party’s] favor may be drawn, the moving 
party simply cannot obtain a summary 
judgment.”  Binder & Binder PC v. 
Barnhart, 481 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Inferences and burdens of proof on cross-
motions for summary judgment are the same 
as those for a unilateral motion.  See Straube 
v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp.                                                                                    
9-14.)  ReDigi has also abandoned its argument that 
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 
512, bars Capitol’s claim.  (Id. at 22.)  As such, the 
Court will consider only those arguments made in the 
instant motions.      
1164, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  “That is, each 
cross-movant must present sufficient 
evidence to satisfy its burden of proof on all 
material facts.”  U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. 
v. Roka LLC, No. 99 Civ. 10136 (AGS), 
2000 WL 1473607, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
29, 2000); see Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 
F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1988).  
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants 
“the owner of copyright under this title” 
certain “exclusive rights,” including the 
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies or phonorecords,” “to distribute 
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer 
of ownership,” and to publicly perform and 
display certain copyrighted works.  17 
U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3)-(5).  However, these 
exclusive rights are limited by several 
subsequent sections of the statute.  
Pertinently, Section 109 sets forth the “first 
sale” doctrine, which provides that “the 
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”  Id. 
§ 109(a).  The novel question presented in 
this action is whether a digital music file, 
lawfully made and purchased, may be resold 
by its owner through ReDigi under the first 
sale doctrine.  The Court determines that it 
cannot.  
 
A.  Infringement of Capitol’s Copyrights 
 
To state a claim for copyright 
infringement, a plaintiff must establish that 
it owns a valid copyright in the work at issue 
and that the defendant violated one of the 
exclusive rights the plaintiff holds in the 
work.  Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns 
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Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 
1993) (citing  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).  It 
is undisputed that Capitol owns copyrights 
in a number of the recordings sold on 
ReDigi’s website.  (See Cap.  56.1 ¶¶ 68-73; 
RD Rep. 56.1 18-19, ¶¶ 68-73; Decl. of 
Richard S. Mandel, dated July 19, 2012, 
Doc. No. 52 (“Mandel Decl.”), ¶ 16, Ex. M; 
Decl. of Alasdair J. McMullan, dated July 
19, 2012, Doc. No. 51 (“McMullan Decl.”), 
¶¶ 3-5, Ex. 1.)  It is also undisputed that 
Capitol did not approve the reproduction or 
distribution of its copyrighted recordings on 
ReDigi’s website.  Thus, if digital music files 
are “reproduce[d]” and “distribute[d]” on 
ReDigi’s website within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act, Capitol’s copyrights have 
been infringed.  
 
1.  Reproduction Rights 
 
Courts have consistently held that the 
unauthorized duplication of digital music 
files over the Internet infringes a copyright 
owner’s exclusive right to reproduce.  See, 
e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).  
However, courts have not previously 
addressed whether the unauthorized transfer 
of a digital music file over the Internet – 
where only one file exists before and after 
the transfer – constitutes reproduction within 
the meaning of the Copyright Act.  The 
Court holds that it does.   
    
The Copyright Act provides that a 
copyright owner has the exclusive right “to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in . . . 
phonorecords.”  17 U. S. C. § 106(1) 
(emphasis added).  Copyrighted works are 
defined to include, inter alia, “sound 
recordings,” which are “works that result 
from the fixation of a series of musical, 
spoken, or other sounds.”  Id. § 101.  Such 
works are distinguished from their material 
embodiments.  These include phonorecords, 
which are the “material objects in which 
sounds . . . are fixed by any method now 
known or later developed, and from which 
the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”  Id. 
§ 101 (emphasis added).  Thus, the plain text 
of the Copyright Act makes clear that 
reproduction occurs when a copyrighted 
work is fixed in a new material object.  See 
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., 
158 F.3d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 
The legislative history of the Copyright 
Act bolsters this reading.  The House Report 
on the Copyright Act distinguished between 
sound recordings and phonorecords, stating 
that “[t]he copyrightable work comprises the 
aggregation of sounds and not the tangible 
medium of fixation.  Thus, ‘sound 
recordings’ as copyrightable subject matter 
are distinguished from ‘phonorecords[,]’ the 
latter being physical objects in which sounds 
are fixed.”  H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 56 
(1976).  Similarly, the House and Senate 
Reports on the Act both explained: 
 
Read together with the relevant 
definitions in [S]ection 101, the right 
“to reproduce the copyrighted work 
in copies or phonorecords” means 
the right to produce a material object 
in which the work is duplicated, 
transcribed, imitated, or simulated in 
a fixed form from which it can be 
“perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”  
 
Id. at 61; S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 58 (1975).  
Put differently, the reproduction right is the 
exclusive right to embody, and to prevent 
others from embodying, the copyrighted 
work (or sound recording) in a new material 
object (or phonorecord).  See Nimmer on 
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Copyright § 8.02 (stating that “in order to 
infringe the reproduction right, the 
defendant must embody the plaintiff’s work 
in a ‘material object’”).  
       
Courts that have dealt with infringement 
on peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing systems 
provide valuable guidance on the application 
of this right in the digital domain.  For 
instance, in London-Sire Records, Inc. v. 
John Doe 1, the court addressed whether 
users of P2P software violated copyright 
owners’ distribution rights.  542 F. Supp. 2d 
153, 166 & n.16 (D. Mass. 2008).  Citing the 
“material object” requirement, the court 
expressly differentiated between the 
copyrighted work – or digital music file – 
and the phonorecord – or “appropriate 
segment of the hard disk” that the file would 
be embodied in following its transfer.  Id. at 
171.  Specifically,  
 
[w]hen a user on a [P2P] network 
downloads a song from another user, 
he receives into his computer a 
digital sequence representing the 
sound recording.  That sequence is 
magnetically encoded on a segment 
of his hard disk (or likewise written 
on other media).  With the right 
hardware and software, the 
downloader can use the magnetic 
sequence to reproduce the sound 
recording.  The electronic file (or, 
perhaps more accurately, the 
appropriate segment of the hard disk) 
is therefore a “phonorecord” within 
the meaning of the statute. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Accordingly, when a 
user downloads a digital music file or 
“digital sequence” to his “hard disk,” the file 
is “reproduce[d]” on a new phonorecord 
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.  
Id.   
 
 This understanding is, of course, 
confirmed by the laws of physics.  It is 
simply impossible that the same “material 
object” can be transferred over the Internet.  
Thus, logically, the court in London-Sire 
noted that the Internet transfer of a file 
results in a material object being “created 
elsewhere at its finish.”  Id. at 173.  Because 
the reproduction right is necessarily 
implicated when a copyrighted work is 
embodied in a new material object, and 
because digital music files must be 
embodied in a new material object following 
their transfer over the Internet, the Court 
determines that the embodiment of a digital 
music file on a new hard disk is a 
reproduction within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act. 
 
This finding holds regardless of whether 
one or multiple copies of the file exist.  
London-Sire, like all of the P2P cases, 
obviously concerned multiple copies of one 
digital music file.  But that distinction is 
immaterial under the plain language of the 
Copyright Act.  Simply put, it is the creation 
of a new material object and not an 
additional material object that defines the 
reproduction right.  The dictionary defines 
“reproduction” to mean, inter alia, “to 
produce again” or “to cause to exist again or 
anew.”  See Merriam-Webster Collegiate 
Edition 994 (10th ed. 1998) (emphasis 
added).  Significantly, it is not defined as “to 
produce again while the original exists.”  
Thus, the right “to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in . . . phonorecords” is 
implicated whenever a sound recording is 
fixed in a new material object, regardless of 
whether the sound recording remains fixed 
in the original material object.     
 
Given this finding, the Court concludes 
that ReDigi’s service infringes Capitol’s 
reproduction rights under any description of 
the technology.  ReDigi stresses that it 
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“migrates” a file from a user’s computer to 
its Cloud Locker, so that the same file is 
transferred to the ReDigi server and no 
copying occurs.5
 
  However, even if that 
were the case, the fact that a file has moved 
from one material object – the user’s 
computer – to another – the ReDigi server – 
means that a reproduction has occurred.  
Similarly, when a ReDigi user downloads a 
new purchase from the ReDigi website to 
her computer, yet another reproduction is 
created.  It is beside the point that the 
original phonorecord no longer exists.  It 
matters only that a new phonorecord has 
been created.      
ReDigi struggles to avoid this conclusion 
by pointing to C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, a 
1973 case from the Northern District of 
Texas where the defendant used chemicals 
to lift images off of greeting cards and place 
them on plaques for resale.  355 F. Supp. 
189, 190 (N.D. Tex. 1973); (see ReDigi 
Mem. of Law, dated July 20, 2012, Doc. No. 
55 (“ReDigi Mem.”), at 13).  The court 
determined that infringement did not occur                                                         
5 It bears noting that ReDigi made numerous 
admissions to the contrary at the preliminary 
injunction stage.  For instance, in its opposition to 
Capitol’s motion, ReDigi stated that, “The only 
copying which takes place in the ReDigi service 
occurs when a user uploads music files to the ReDigi 
Cloud, . . . or downloads music files from the user’s 
Cloud Locker.”  (See ReDigi Opp’n to PI at 9 
(emphasis added).)  ReDigi also stated that, after a 
digital music file was uploaded to the Cloud Locker, 
“the copy from which it was made was actually 
deleted from the user’s machine.”  (Id. at 14 
(emphasis added).)  ReDigi’s officers made similar 
statements in their depositions, and ReDigi’s patent 
application for its upload technology states that “to 
be offered for sale, [a music file] is first copied to the 
remote server and stored on the disc.”  (See Capitol 
Mem. of Law, dated July 20, 2012, Doc. No. 49 
(“Cap. Mem.”), at 8-9, n.6 (emphasis added).)  But, 
as earlier stated, these semantic distinctions are 
immaterial as even ReDigi’s most recent description 
of its service runs afoul of the Copyright Act. 
 
because “should defendant desire to make 
one hundred ceramic plaques . . . , defendant 
would be required to purchase one hundred 
separate . . . prints.”  C.M. Paula, 355 F. 
Supp. at 191.  ReDigi argues that, like the 
defendant in C.M. Paula, its users must 
purchase a song on iTunes in order to sell a 
song on ReDigi.  (ReDigi Mem. 13.)  
Therefore, no “duplication” occurs.  See 
C.M. Paula, 355 F. Supp. at 191 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  ReDigi’s 
argument is unavailing.  Ignoring the 
questionable merits of the court’s holding in 
C.M. Paula, ReDigi’s service is 
distinguishable from the process in that case.  
There, the copyrighted print, or material 
object, was lifted from the greeting card and 
transferred in toto to the ceramic tile; no 
new material object was created.  By 
contrast, ReDigi’s service by necessity 
creates a new material object when a digital 
music file is either uploaded to or 
downloaded from the Cloud Locker.    
 
ReDigi also argues that the Court’s 
conclusion would lead to “irrational” 
outcomes, as it would render illegal any 
movement of copyrighted files on a hard 
drive, including relocating files between 
directories and defragmenting.  (ReDigi 
Opp’n, dated Aug. 14, 2012, Doc. No. 79 
(“ReDigi Opp’n”), at 8.)  However, this 
argument is nothing more than a red herring.  
As Capitol has conceded, such reproduction 
is almost certainly protected under other 
doctrines or defenses, and is not relevant to 
the instant motion.  (Cap. Reply, dated Aug. 
24, 2012, Doc. No. 87 (“Cap. Reply”), at 5 
n.1.)   
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that, absent 
the existence of an affirmative defense, the 
sale of digital music files on ReDigi’s 
website infringes Capitol’s exclusive right 
of reproduction.      
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2.  Distribution Rights 
 
In addition to the reproduction right, a 
copyright owner also has the exclusive right 
“to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership.”  17 U. S. C. 
§ 106(3).  Like the court in London-Sire, the 
Court agrees that “[a]n electronic file 
transfer is plainly within the sort of 
transaction that § 106(3) was intended to 
reach [and] . . . fit[s] within the definition of 
‘distribution’ of a phonorecord.”  London-
Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 173-74.  For that 
reason, “courts have not hesitated to find 
copyright infringement by distribution in 
cases of file-sharing or electronic 
transmission of copyrighted works.”  Arista 
Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 
961, 968 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (collecting 
cases); see, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.  
Indeed, in New York Times Co., Inc. v. 
Tasini, the Supreme Court stated it was 
“clear” that an online news database violated 
authors’ distribution rights by selling 
electronic copies of their articles for 
download.  533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001).   
 
There is no dispute that sales occurred on 
ReDigi’s website.  Capitol has established 
that it was able to buy more than one-
hundred of its own recordings on ReDigi’s 
webite, and ReDigi itself compiled a list of 
its completed sales of Capitol’s recordings.  
(Cap. 56.1 ¶¶ 68-73; RD Rep. 56.1 ¶¶ 68-
73.)  ReDigi, in fact, does not contest that 
distribution occurs on its website – it only 
asserts that the distribution is protected by 
the fair use and first sale defenses.  (See, 
e.g., ReDigi Opp’n 15 (noting that “any 
distributions . . . which occur on the ReDigi 
marketplace are protected”).)     
 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that, 
absent the existence of an affirmative 
defense, the sale of digital music files on 
ReDigi’s website infringes Capitol’s 
exclusive right of distribution.6
 
                
3.  Performance and Display Rights 
 
Finally, a copyright owner has the 
exclusive right, “in the case of . . . musical 
. . . works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly.”  17 U. S. C. § 106(4).  Public 
performance includes transmission to the 
public regardless of “whether the members 
of the public . . . receive it in the same place 
or in separate places and at the same time or 
at different times.”  Id. § 101.  Accordingly, 
audio streams are performances because a 
“stream is an electronic transmission that 
renders the musical work audible as it is 
received by the client-computer’s temporary 
memory.  This transmission, like a television 
or radio broadcast, is a performance because 
there is a playing of the song that is 
perceived simultaneously with the 
transmission.”  United States v. Am. Soc. Of 
Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 627 
F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2010).  To state a claim 
for infringement of the performance right, a 
plaintiff must establish that (1) the public 
performance or display of the copyrighted 
work was for profit, and (2) the defendant 
lacked authorization from the plaintiff or the                                                         
6 Capitol argues that ReDigi also violated its 
distribution rights simply by making Capitol’s 
recordings available for sale to the public, regardless 
of whether a sale occurred.  (See Cap. Mem. 11 n.8 
(citing Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1997)).  
However, a number of courts, including one in this 
district, have cast significant doubt on this “make 
available” theory of distribution.  See, e.g., Elektra 
Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he support in the case law for 
the “make available” theory of liability is quite 
limited.”); London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 169 
(“[T]he defendants cannot be liable for violating the 
plaintiffs’ distribution right unless a ‘distribution’ 
actually occurred.”).  In any event, because the Court 
concludes that actual sales on ReDigi’s website 
infringed Capitol’s distribution right, it does not 
reach this additional theory of liability. 
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plaintiff’s representative.  See Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. 315 W. 44th St. Rest. Corp., No. 93 
Civ. 8082 (MBM), 1995 WL 408399, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995).        
 
The copyright owner also has the 
exclusive right, “in the case of . . . pictorial 
[and] graphic . . . works[,] . . . to display the 
copyrighted work publicly.”  17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(5).  Public display includes 
“show[ing] a copy of [a work], either 
directly or by means of a film, slide, 
television image, or any other device or 
process.”  Id. § 101.  The Ninth Circuit has 
held that the display of a photographic 
image on a computer may implicate the 
display right, though infringement hinges, in 
part, on where the image was hosted.  
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007).      
 
Capitol alleges that ReDigi infringed its 
copyrights by streaming thirty-second song 
clips and exhibiting album cover art to 
potential buyers.  (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26.)  
ReDigi counters that it only posted such 
content pursuant to a licensing agreement 
and within the terms of that agreement.  
(ReDigi Mem. 24-25.)  ReDigi also asserts 
that it promptly removed the content when 
its licenses were terminated, and instead sent 
users to YouTube or iTunes for previews.  
(Id.)  Capitol, in response, claims that 
ReDigi’s use violated the terms of those 
licenses and did not cease at the time the 
licenses were terminated.  (Compare RD 
56.1 ¶¶ 73-79, with Cap. Rep. 56.1 ¶¶ 73-
79.)  As such, there are material disputes as 
to the source of the content, whether ReDigi 
was authorized to transmit the content, when 
authorization was or was not revoked, and 
when ReDigi ceased providing the content.  
Because the Court cannot determine whether 
ReDigi infringed Capitol’s display and 
performance rights on the present record, 
ReDigi’s motion for summary judgment on 
its alleged infringement of these exclusive 
rights is denied.              
 
B.  Affirmative Defenses 
 
Having concluded that sales on ReDigi’s 
website infringe Capitol’s exclusive rights 
of reproduction and distribution, the Court 
turns to whether the fair use or first sale 
defenses excuse that infringement.  For the 
reasons set forth below, the Court 
determines that they do not.  
 
1.  Fair Use 
 
 “The ultimate test of fair use . . . is 
whether the copyright law’s goal of 
‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts’ would be better served by 
allowing the use than by preventing it.”  
Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g 
Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).  
Accordingly, fair use permits reproduction 
of copyrighted work without the copyright 
owner’s consent “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.”  
17 U.S.C. § 107.  The list is not exhaustive 
but merely illustrates the types of copying 
typically embraced by fair use.  Castle Rock 
Entm’t, Inc., 150 F.3d at 141.  In addition, 
four statutory factors guide courts’ 
application of the doctrine.  Specifically, 
courts look to:     
(1) the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
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upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.  
17 U.S.C. § 107.  Because fair use is an 
“equitable rule of reason,” courts are “free to 
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on 
a case-by-case basis.”  Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
448 n.31 (1984) (quoting H. Rep. No. 94-
1476, at 65-66); see Iowa State Univ. 
Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 
621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 On the record before it, the Court has 
little difficulty concluding that ReDigi’s 
reproduction and distribution of Capitol’s 
copyrighted works falls well outside the fair 
use defense.  ReDigi obliquely argues that 
uploading to and downloading from the 
Cloud Locker for storage and personal use 
are protected fair use.7
 Each of the statutory factors counsels 
against a finding of fair use.  The first factor 
requires the Court to determine whether 
ReDigi’s use “transforms” the copyrighted 
work and whether it is commercial.  
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994).  Both inquiries 
disfavor ReDigi’s claim.  Plainly, the 
upload, sale, and download of digital music 
files on ReDigi’s website does nothing to 
  (See ReDigi Mem. 
15.)  Significantly, Capitol does not contest 
that claim.  (See Tr. 12:8-23.)  Instead, 
Capitol asserts only that uploading to and 
downloading from the Cloud Locker 
incident to sale fall outside the ambit of fair 
use.  The Court agrees.  See Arista Records, 
LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 
2010) (rejecting application of fair use to 
user uploads and downloads on P2P file-
sharing network). 
                                                        
7 ReDigi’s argument is, perhaps, a relic of the 
argument it previously levied that “copying” to the 
Cloud Locker is protected as “space shifting” under 
the fair use doctrine.  (See ReDigi Opp’n to PI at 10.)            
“add[] something new, with a further 
purpose or different character” to the 
copyrighted works.  Id.; see, e.g., Napster, 
239 F.3d at 1015 (endorsing district court 
finding that “downloading MP3 files does 
not transform the copyrighted work”).  
ReDigi’s use is also undoubtedly 
commercial.  ReDigi and the uploading user 
directly profit from the sale of a digital 
music file, and the downloading user saves 
significantly on the price of the song in the 
primary market.  See Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 562 (1985) (“The crux of the 
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether 
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain 
but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the copyrighted material 
without paying the customary price.”).  
ReDigi asserts that downloads for personal, 
and not public or commercial, use “must be 
characterized as . . . noncommercial, 
nonprofit activity.”  (ReDigi Mem. 16 
(quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449).)  However, 
ReDigi twists the law to fit its facts.  When a 
user downloads purchased files from the 
Cloud Locker, the resultant reproduction is 
an essential component of ReDigi’s 
commercial enterprise.  Thus, ReDigi’s 
argument is unavailing. 
 The second factor – the nature of the 
copyrighted work – also weighs against 
application of the fair use defense, as 
creative works like sound recordings are 
“close to the core of the intended copyright 
protection” and “far removed from the . . . 
factual or descriptive work more amenable 
to fair use.”  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 586).  The third factor – the 
portion of the work copied – suggests a 
similar outcome because ReDigi transmits 
the works in their entirety, “negating any 
claim of fair use.”  Id. at 352.  Finally, 
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ReDigi’s sales are likely to undercut the 
“market for or value of the copyrighted 
work” and, accordingly, the fourth factor 
cuts against a finding of fair use.  Cf. Arista 
Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d at 124 
(rejecting application of fair use to P2P file 
sharing, in part, because “the likely 
detrimental effect of file-sharing on the 
value of copyrighted compositions is well 
documented.” (citing Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913, 923 (2005)).  The product sold in 
ReDigi’s secondary market is 
indistinguishable from that sold in the 
legitimate primary market save for its lower 
price.  The clear inference is that ReDigi 
will divert buyers away from that primary 
market.  ReDigi incredibly argues that 
Capitol is preempted from making a market-
based argument because Capitol itself 
condones downloading of its works on 
iTunes.  (ReDigi Mem. 18.)  Of course, 
Capitol, as copyright owner, does not forfeit 
its right to claim copyright infringement 
merely because it permits certain uses of its 
works.  This argument, too, is therefore 
unavailing.   
 In sum, ReDigi facilitates and profits 
from the sale of copyrighted commercial 
recordings, transferred in their entirety, with 
a likely detrimental impact on the primary 
market for these goods.  Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that the fair use defense 
does not permit ReDigi’s users to upload 
and download files to and from the Cloud 
Locker incident to sale.     
 
2.  First Sale 
 
 The first sale defense, a common law 
principle recognized in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) and now 
codified at Section 109(a) of the Copyright 
Act, provides that: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 106(3), the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any 
person authorized by such owner, is 
entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the possession of that 
copy or phonorecord. 
17 U.S.C. § 109.  Under the first sale 
defense, “once the copyright owner places a 
copyrighted item [here, a phonorecord] in 
the stream of commerce by selling it, he has 
exhausted his exclusive statutory right to 
control its distribution.”  Quality King 
Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 
523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998); see Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697, 2013 
WL 1104736, at *4 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013).             
 
 ReDigi asserts that its service, which 
involves the resale of digital music files 
lawfully purchased on iTunes, is protected 
by the first sale defense.  (ReDigi Mem. 19.)  
The Court disagrees. 
 
 As an initial matter, it should be noted 
that the fair use defense is, by its own terms, 
limited to assertions of the distribution right.  
17 U.S.C. § 109 (referencing Section 
106(3)); see Nimmer on Copyright § 8.12.  
Because the Court has concluded that 
ReDigi’s service violates Capitol’s 
reproduction right, the first sale defense 
does not apply to ReDigi’s infringement of 
those rights.  See Design Options v. 
BellePointe, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86, 91 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
  In addition, the first sale doctrine does 
not protect ReDigi’s distribution of 
Capitol’s copyrighted works.  This is 
because, as an unlawful reproduction, a 
digital music file sold on ReDigi is not 
“lawfully made under this title.”  17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(a).  Moreover, the statute protects 
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only distribution by “the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord . . . of that 
copy or phonorecord.”  Id.  Here, a ReDigi 
user owns the phonorecord that was created 
when she purchased and downloaded a song 
from iTunes to her hard disk.  But to sell 
that song on ReDigi, she must produce a 
new phonorecord on the ReDigi server.  
Because it is therefore impossible for the 
user to sell her “particular” phonorecord on 
ReDigi, the first sale statute cannot provide 
a defense.  Put another way, the first sale 
defense is limited to material items, like 
records, that the copyright owner put into 
the stream of commerce.  Here, ReDigi is 
not distributing such material items; rather, 
it is distributing reproductions of the 
copyrighted code embedded in new material 
objects, namely, the ReDigi server in 
Arizona and its users’ hard drives.  The first 
sale defense does not cover this any more 
than it covered the sale of cassette 
recordings of vinyl records in a bygone era.    
 Rejecting such a conclusion, ReDigi 
argues that, because “‘technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the 
Copyright Act must be construed in light of 
[its] basic purpose,’” namely, to incentivize 
creative work for the “ultimate[] . . . cause 
of promoting broad public availability of 
literature, music, and the other arts.”  Sony, 
464 U.S. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975)).  Thus, ReDigi asserts that refusal to 
apply the first sale doctrine to its service 
would grant Capitol “a Court sanctioned 
extension of rights under the [C]opyright 
[A]ct . . . which is against policy, and should 
not be endorsed by this Court.”  (ReDigi 
Mem. 24.)   
 The Court disagrees.  ReDigi effectively 
requests that the Court amend the statute to 
achieve ReDigi’s broader policy goals – 
goals that happen to advance ReDigi’s 
economic interests.  However, ReDigi’s 
argument fails for two reasons.  First, while 
technological change may have rendered 
Section 109(a) unsatisfactory to many 
contemporary observers and consumers, it 
has not rendered it ambiguous.  The statute 
plainly applies to the lawful owner’s 
“particular” phonorecord, a phonorecord 
that by definition cannot be uploaded and 
sold on ReDigi’s website.  Second, 
amendment of the Copyright Act in line 
with ReDigi’s proposal is a legislative 
prerogative that courts are unauthorized and 
ill suited to attempt.   
 Nor are the policy arguments as 
straightforward or uncontested as ReDigi 
suggests.  Indeed, when confronting this 
precise subject in its report on the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, 
the United States Copyright Office (the 
“USCO”) rejected extension of the first sale 
doctrine to the distribution of digital works, 
noting that the justifications for the first sale 
doctrine in the physical world could not be 
imported into the digital domain.  See 
USCO, Library of Cong., DMCA Section 
104 Report (2001) (“DMCA Report”); see 
also Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding that the DMCA report is entitled to 
deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  For instance, the 
USCO stated that “the impact of the [first 
sale] doctrine on copyright owners [is] 
limited in the off-line world by a number of 
factors, including geography and the gradual 
degradation of books and analog works.”  
DMCA Report at xi.  Specifically,  
[p]hysical copies of works degrade 
with time and use, making used 
copies less desirable than new ones.  
Digital information does not 
degrade, and can be reproduced 
perfectly on a recipient’s computer. 
The “used” copy is just as desirable 
as (in fact, is indistinguishable from) 
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a new copy of the same work.  Time, 
space, effort and cost no longer act 
as barriers to the movement of 
copies, since digital copies can be 
transmitted nearly instantaneously 
anywhere in the world with minimal 
effort and negligible cost.  The need 
to transport physical copies of works, 
which acts as a natural brake on the 
effect of resales on the copyright 
owner’s market, no longer exists in 
the realm of digital transmissions.  
The ability of such “used” copies to 
compete for market share with new 
copies is thus far greater in the 
digital world.   
Id. at 82-83 (footnotes omitted).  Thus, 
while ReDigi mounts attractive policy 
arguments, they are not as one-sided as it 
contends.     
 Finally, ReDigi feebly argues that the 
Court’s reading of Section 109(a) would in 
effect exclude digital works from the 
meaning of the statute.  (ReDigi Mem. 21.)  
That is not the case.  Section 109(a) still 
protects a lawful owner’s sale of her 
“particular” phonorecord, be it a computer 
hard disk, iPod, or other memory device 
onto which the file was originally 
downloaded.  While this limitation clearly 
presents obstacles to resale that are different 
from, and perhaps even more onerous than, 
those involved in the resale of CDs and 
cassettes, the limitation is hardly absurd – 
the first sale doctrine was enacted in a world 
where the ease and speed of data transfer 
could not have been imagined.  There are 
many reasons, some discussed herein, for 
why such physical limitations may be 
desirable.  It is left to Congress, and not this 
Court, to deem them outmoded.  
 
 Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 
first sale defense does not permit sales of 
digital music files on ReDigi’s website.      
C.  Liability 
 
 Having determined that sales on ReDigi’s 
website infringe Capitol’s copyrights, the 
Court turns to whether ReDigi is directly 
and/or secondarily liable for that 
infringement.  Direct liability requires 
“volitional conduct” that “causes” the 
reproduction or distribution to be made.  See 
Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131.  
Secondary infringement occurs when a 
defendant contributed to or benefitted from a 
third party’s infringement such that it is 
“just” to hold the defendant accountable for 
the infringing activity.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 
435.  For the reasons stated below, the Court 
finds that ReDigi directly and secondarily 
infringed Capitol’s copyrights. 
 
1.  Direct Infringement 
 
To be liable for direct infringement, a 
defendant must have “engaged in some 
volitional conduct sufficient to show that [it] 
actively” violated one of the plaintiff’s 
exclusive rights.  Arista Records LLC v. 
Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 148 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).  In other words, “‘to 
establish direct liability under . . . the Act, 
something more must be shown than mere 
ownership of a machine used by others to 
make illegal copies.  There must be actual 
infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently 
close and causal to the illegal copying that 
one could conclude that the machine owner 
himself trespassed on the exclusive domain 
of the copyright owner.’”  Cartoon Network, 
536 F.3d at 130 (quoting CoStar Group, Inc. 
v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 
2004)) (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 
F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 
In Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit 
addressed whether the cable television 
provider Cablevision had directly infringed 
the plaintiff’s copyrights by providing 
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digital video recording devices to its 
customers.  536 F.3d 121.  The court 
determined that it had not.  Though 
Cablevision had “design[ed], hous[ed], and 
maintain[ed]” the recording devices, it was 
Cablevision’s customers who “made” the 
copies and therefore directly infringed the 
plaintiff’s reproduction rights.  Id. at 131-32.  
The court reasoned that, “[i]n determining 
who actually ‘makes’ a copy, a significant 
difference exists between making a request 
to a human employee, who then volitionally 
operates the copying system to make the 
copy, and issuing a command directly to a 
system, which automatically obeys 
commands and engages in no volitional 
conduct.”  Id. at 131.  However, the court 
allowed that a case may exist where “one’s 
contribution to the creation of an infringing 
copy [is] so great that it warrants holding 
that party directly liable for the 
infringement, even though another party has 
actually made the copy.”  Cartoon Network, 
536 F.3d at 133.   
On the record before it, the Court 
concludes that, if such a case could ever 
occur, it has occurred with ReDigi.  
ReDigi’s founders built a service where only 
copyrighted work could be sold.  Unlike 
Cablevision’s programming, which offered a 
mix of protected and public television, 
ReDigi’s Media Manager scans a user’s 
computer to build a list of eligible files that 
consists solely of protected music purchased 
on iTunes.  While that process is itself 
automated, absolving ReDigi of direct 
liability on that ground alone would be a 
distinction without a difference.  The fact 
that ReDigi’s founders programmed their 
software to choose copyrighted content 
satisfies the volitional conduct requirement 
and renders ReDigi’s case indistinguishable 
from those where human review of content 
gave rise to direct liability.  See Usenet.com, 
633 F. Supp. 2d at 148; Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 
503, 512-13 (N.D. Ohio 1997).  Moreover, 
unlike Cablevision, ReDigi infringed both 
Capitol’s reproduction and distribution 
rights.  ReDigi provided the infrastructure 
for its users’ infringing sales and 
affirmatively brokered sales by connecting 
users who are seeking unavailable songs 
with potential sellers.  Given this 
fundamental and deliberate role, the Court 
concludes that ReDigi’s conduct 
“transform[ed] [it] from [a] passive 
provider[] of a space in which infringing 
activities happened to occur to [an] active 
participant[] in the process of copyright 
infringement.”  Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d 
at 148.  Accordingly, the Court grants 
Capitol’s motion for summary judgment on 
its claims for ReDigi’s direct infringement 
of its distribution and reproduction rights.8
2.  Secondary Infringement 
      
 
 “The Copyright Act does not expressly 
render anyone liable for infringement 
committed by another.”  Sony, 464 U.S. at 
434.  However, common law doctrines 
permit a court to impose secondary liability 
where “just” and appropriate.  Id. at 435.  
Capitol asserts that ReDigi is secondarily 
liable for its users’ direct infringement under 
three such doctrines: contributory                                                         
8 Capitol also asserts a claim for common law 
copyright infringement arising from sales of its pre-
1972 recordings on ReDigi’s website.  (Compl. 
¶¶ 82-88.)  Capitol correctly argues in its 
memorandum that the elements for a direct 
infringement claim under federal law mirror those for 
infringement of common law copyright under state 
law.  See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 
4 N.Y.3d 540, 563 (2005); (Cap. Mem. 4.)  
Accordingly, the Court also Court grants Capitol’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to 
ReDigi’s direct infringement of Capitol’s distribution 
and reproduction rights in its pre-1972 recordings.  
However, because neither Capitol nor ReDigi 
addressed the question of secondary infringement of 
common law copyrights, the Court does not reach 
that claim.      
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infringement, inducement of infringement, 
and vicarious infringement.  (Cap. Mem. 13-
16.)  The Court agrees with respect to 
contributory and vicarious infringement, and 
therefore does not reach the inducement 
claim.   
 
a.  Contributory Infringement 
 
 Contributory infringement occurs where 
“one . . . with knowledge of the infringing 
activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another.”  Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 
604 F.3d at 118 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g 
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)); see, e.g., 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930.  The knowledge 
requirement is “objective” and satisfied 
where the defendant knew or had reason to 
know of the infringing activity.  See Arista 
Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d at 118.  
Further, the support must be “more than a 
mere quantitative contribution to the 
primary infringement . . . [, it] must be 
substantial.”  Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d 
124, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  However, even 
where a defendant’s contribution is material, 
it may evade liability if its product is 
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”  
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (the “Sony-Betamax 
rule”). 
   
 In weighing the knowledge requirement, 
courts consider evidence of actual and 
constructive knowledge, including cease-
and-desist letters, officer and employee 
statements, promotional materials, and 
industry experience.  See, e.g., Napster, 239 
F.3d at 1020-21, 1027; Arista Records LLC 
v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 432; 
Usenet.com 633 F. Supp. 2d at 155.  In 
addition, courts have consistently found that 
material support existed where file-sharing 
systems provided “the site and facilities” for 
their users’ infringement.  Napster, 239 F.3d 
at 1022; see, e.g., Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 
2d at 155.   
 
 The Court has little difficulty concluding 
that ReDigi knew or should have known that 
its service would encourage infringement.  
Despite the fact that ReDigi boasted on its 
website that it was “The Legal Alternative” 
and insisted “YES, ReDigi is LEGAL,” 
ReDigi warned investors in its subscription 
agreements that “the law cannot be said to 
be well-settled” in this area and that it could 
not guarantee ReDigi would prevail on its 
copyright defenses. (Cap. 56.1 ¶¶ 65-66.)  
The Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”) sent ReDigi a cease-and-
desist letter in November 2011, advising 
ReDigi that its website violated Capitol’s 
and other RIAA members’ copyrights. 
(Compl. ¶ 41.)  Further, ReDigi was 
ensnared in a licensing dispute over song 
clips and cover art shortly after its launch, 
plainly indicating that infringement could be 
afoot.  (RD 56.1 ¶¶ 74-75, 77.)  ReDigi was 
also, of course, aware that copyright 
protected content was being sold on its 
website – a fact central to its business model 
and promotional campaigns. (Cap. 56.1 ¶¶ 
70-73).  Finally, ReDigi’s officers claim to 
have “researched copyright law [and] 
consulted with attorneys” concerning their 
service, and also to have met with record 
companies “to get input, get marketing 
support[,] and enter into deals with the 
labels.” (RD Rep. 56.1 2 ¶ 5, 5 ¶ 20.)  By 
educating themselves, the officers 
presumably understood the likelihood that 
use of ReDigi’s service would result in 
infringement.  Indeed, though ReDigi 
attempts to use its consultations with 
counsel as a shield, it is telling that ReDigi 
declined to reveal any of the advice it 
received on the subject.  (See Cap. Reply 9).  
ReDigi’s lone rebuttal to this surfeit of 
evidence could only be that it “sincerely” 
believed in the legality of its service.  
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However, the Court has not found and will 
not create a subjective, good faith defense to 
contributory liability’s objective knowledge 
requirement, and therefore concludes that, 
based on the objective facts, ReDigi was 
aware of its users’ infringement.   
 
 The Court also finds that ReDigi 
materially contributed to its users’ 
infringement.  As ReDigi has admitted, 
“more than any other website that permits 
the sale of music, ReDigi is intimately 
involved in examining the content that will 
be sold and supervising the steps involved in 
making the music available for sale and 
selling it.”  (Cap. 56.1 ¶ 35; RD Rep. 56.1 
15 ¶ 35.)  ReDigi thus provided the “site and 
facilities” for the direct infringement.  See, 
e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022; Usenet.com, 
633 F. Supp. 2d at 155; Lime Grp., 784 F. 
Supp. 2d at 434.  Without ReDigi’s Cloud 
Locker, no infringement could have 
occurred.  Indeed, Media Manager ensured 
that only infringement occurred by limiting 
eligible files to iTunes tracks.  Contrary to 
any conception of remote conduct, ReDigi’s 
service was the hub and heart of its users’ 
infringing activity. 
 
 The Court finally concludes that 
ReDigi’s service is not capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.  The Sony-
Betamax rule requires a court to determine 
whether a product or service is capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses, not whether 
it is currently used in a non-infringing 
manner.  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 
(discussing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-43).  But, 
put simply, ReDigi, by virtue of its design, 
is incapable of compliance with the law.  
ReDigi’s business is built on the erroneous 
notion that the first sale defense permits the 
electronic resale of digital music.  As such, 
ReDigi is built to trade only in copyright 
protected iTunes files.  However, as 
determined above, ReDigi’s legal argument 
– and therefore business model – is 
fundamentally flawed.  Accordingly, to 
comply with the law, either the law or 
ReDigi must change.  While ReDigi 2.0, 3.0, 
or 4.0 may ultimately be deemed to comply 
with copyright law – a finding the Court 
need not and does not now make – it is clear 
that ReDigi 1.0 does not.  Given the 
fundamental disconnect between ReDigi and 
the Copyright Act, and ReDigi’s failure to 
provide any evidence of present or potential 
noninfringing uses, the Court concludes that 
the Sony-Betamax rule cannot save ReDigi 
from contributory liability.     
 
 Accordingly, the Court grants Capitol’s 
motion for summary judgment on its claim 
for ReDigi’s contributory infringement of its 
distribution and reproduction rights.9
 
 
b.  Vicarious Infringement 
 
Vicarious liability for copyright 
infringement exists where the defendant 
“‘has the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also has a direct 
financial interest in such activities.’”  
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting 
Gershwin Pub. Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162); see 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930.  Unlike 
contributory infringement, knowledge is not 
an element of vicarious liability.  Gershwin,                                                         
9 As noted above, Capitol has alleged a separate 
cause of action for inducement of infringement.  
(Compl. ¶¶ 51-60.)  Disagreement exists over 
whether “inducement of infringement” is a separate 
theory of liability for copyright infringement or 
merely a subset of contributory liability.  Compare 
Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 758 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (describing inducement as “a form of 
contributory infringement”), with Lime Grp., 784 F. 
Supp. 2d at 424 (“In Grokster, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that inducement of copyright infringement 
constitutes a distinct cause of action.”).  Regardless, 
because the Court concludes that ReDigi is liable for 
contributing to its users’ direct infringement of 
Capitol’s copyrights, it does not reach Capitol’s 
inducement claim. 
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443 F .2d at I 162; see F onovisa, Inc. v. 
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
Clearly, ReDigi vicariously infringed 
Capitol's copyrights. As discussed, ReDigi 
exercised complete control over its 
website's content, user access, and sales. 
Indeed, ReDigi admits that it "is intimately 
involved in . . . supervising the steps 
involved in making the music available for 
sale and selling it" on the website. (Cap. 
56.1 ~ 35; RD Rep. 56.1 '135); see, e.g., 
Lime Grp., 784 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (finding 
right to supervise where P2P file sharing 
system could filter content and regulate 
users). In addition, ReDigi financially 
benefitted from every infringing sale when it 
collected 60% of each transaction fee. See, 
e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Ii L. 
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(finding a direct financial benefit where the 
defendant received a share of the gross 
receipts on every infringing sale). Notably, 
ReDigi failed to address any of these 
arguments in its opposition brief, instead 
insisting that it was not vicariously liable for 
infringement that occurred outside the 
ReDigi service, for instance, when a user 
impermissibly retained files on his 
computer. (See ReDigi Opp'n 22-23.) 
However, this argument is inapposite to the 
instant motions. Accordingly, the Court 
grants Capitol's motion for summary 
judgment on its claim for ReDigi's vicarious 
infringement of its distribution and 
reproduction rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At base, ReDigi seeks judicial 
amendment of the Copyright Act to reach its 
desired policy outcome. However, "[s]ound 
policy, as well as history, supports [the 
Court's] consistent deference to Congress 
when major technological innovations alter 
market for copyrighted materials. 
C ngress has the constitutional authority 
an the institutional ability to accommodate 
fu ly the varied permutations of competing 
in erests that are inevitably implicated by 
su 'h new technology." Sony, 464 U.S. at 
431. Such deference often counsels for a 
Ii ited interpretation of copyright 
pr tection. However, here, the Court cannot 
of its own accord condone the wholesale 
ap lication of the first sale defense to the 
di ital sphere, particularly when Congress 
its If has declined to take that step. 
A cordingly, and for the reasons stated 
ab ve, the Court GRANTS Capitol's motion 
fo summary judgment on its claims for 
Re igi's direct, contributory, and vicarious 
ingement of its distribution and 
roduction rights. The Court also 
NIES ReDigi's motion in its entirety. 
Because issues remain with respect to 
Ca ito1's performance and display rights, 
an ReDigi's secondary infringement of 
Capitol's common law copyrights, as well as 
da~ages, injunctive relief, and attorney's 
fees. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the 
I' 
pal' ies shall submit a joint letter to the Court 
no later than April 12,2013 concerning the 
ne t contemplated steps in this case. 
The Clerk of Court is respectfully 
dir cted to terminate the motions pending at 




Da1ed: March 30,2013 
New York, New York 
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